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Howe: President’s Forum

PRESIDENT’S FORUM

The Rules of the Game and Professional Military Ethics

I’d like to share some thoughts
about a recent addition to my bookshelf: The Rules of the Game:
Jutland and British Naval Command, by Andrew Gordon (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013). At first glance, it looks like a rather obscure history book
on the battle of Jutland. After reading it, however, I now see it as an astute study
of command culture with important insights on professional military ethics. This
is a book with which every member of the maritime profession of arms should
spend time.
Before diving into the book and its lessons, let me explain how it got on my
bookshelf.
One of the best parts of this assignment is the opportunity to meet with all
the great leaders who visit the Naval War College over the course of a year. Last
fall, General James Mattis, USMC (Ret.), was here in Newport for a lecture of
opportunity, and I had a chance to speak with him prior to the lecture. We discussed the leader development challenge the Navy is addressing today: how best
to prepare our leaders for naval warfare at sea, with near-peer competitors, in an
age of precision strike, and in an increasingly complex operational environment.
When I asked whether he had any recommendations on books to read that
might be relevant, he stated without hesitation: “Gardner, you have to read The
Rules of the Game—it tells the story of what happened to Britain’s Royal Navy
between Nelson at Trafalgar and Jellicoe at Jutland.”
With only a foggy knowledge of Jellicoe and the faintest understanding of the
battle of Jutland, I responded with a hearty “Wilco, sir,” and we headed off to his
lecture.
IN THIS PRESIDENT’S FORUM,
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That night, I went home and ordered the book on Amazon. Three days later,
the package arrived; I was ready to rip through the book and looked forward to
its leadership lessons. Well, I opened the package and my jaw dropped—I saw this
tome of a book, more than two inches thick and over seven hundred pages. My
dreams of a quick read and quick lessons on leader development were dashed.
But, motivated by the directness of General Mattis’s recommendation, I waded
into the book. By the time I was finished, I knew I had read a seminal document
with important implications for how I thought about the maritime profession of
arms and the enduring ethical challenges our members face.
In the introduction, Gordon, a noted naval historian, explains that the book
originated out of a simple disagreement with a retired naval officer about the
appropriateness of the tactics the British employed at Jutland. In this discussion,
Gordon suggested that, on meeting the German High Seas Fleet, the British 5th
Battle Squadron either should have turned in succession immediately or turned
all together, rather than turning in the delayed, in-succession manner in which
it did. Gordon’s suggestion provoked such a strong response from his colleague
that he decided to dive into his own primary-source research. Over the course
of that research, Gordon’s focus shifted from the history of the battle and “could
have / should have” questions to a detailed look at the command culture of the
Royal Navy—more specifically, the changes in the command culture of the Royal
Navy from Nelson at Trafalgar to Jellicoe at Jutland—and the key forces that
drove those changes.
Shifting from Nelson’s Command Culture
The battle of Trafalgar was fought off the Spanish coast on 21 October 1805. In
this most decisive naval engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, Nelson’s twentyseven ships went up against the thirty-three ships of the combined Spanish and
French fleets. Twenty-two Spanish and French ships were lost, while the British
didn’t lose a single ship.
The manner in which Nelson commanded during this battle sealed his legacy
as an extraordinary combat leader. He focused his energy on setting conditions
for success in battle well before the battle itself. He held frequent, face-to-face
meetings with his commanders to ensure they had a common understanding of
the situation, the enemy, and his intent. He encouraged initiative and empowered his subordinate commanders at every level. Together, these actions allowed
Nelson to execute decentralized operations effectively and succeed in combat. A
master of what we now know as mission command, Nelson was a professional
whose “greatest gift of leadership was to raise his juniors above the need of supervision” (Gordon, The Rules of the Game, p. 160).
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About halfway through the book, Gordon has a chapter titled “The Long Calm
Lee of Trafalgar.” It’s here that Gordon moves away from the battle of Jutland itself
and spends the next two-hundred-plus pages recounting the changes in British
command culture, and the drivers of those changes, in the century between Trafalgar and Jutland.
In the aftermath of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy reigned supreme across the
oceans of the world during a period of significant social and technological
change. This period witnessed the rise of Victorian culture as Britain enjoyed
prosperity and the ever-increasing spread of its empire. Gordon writes (p. 179),
“The Victorians sought to structure and codify as many fields of behavior as possible in order to regulate their world, disarm the unpredictable, and perpetuate
the status quo.” As William Manchester writes in The Last Lion, central to the Victorian’s worldview was a “firm belief in obedience—absolute obedience to God,
the Queen, and one’s superiors. . . . It was a time of pervasive authoritarianism
. . . [and] [u]nquestioning submission to orders.”* The way to succeed in life, as in
sport, was to play by the rules of the game—to comply with the established order.
With some understanding, Gordon notes (p. 182) that “the tendency of the late
Victorians to ritualize and regulate, and thereby ‘tokenize,’ warfare was perhaps a
natural one for the world’s foremost territorial freeholder.”
This was also a period of significant technological change. As the Industrial
Revolution progressed, ships’ propulsion transitioned from sail to steam and
their weapons transitioned from cannon to guns. Gordon asserts (p. 183) that
these changes resulted in a new era of seamanship for the Royal Navy, a “seamanship of iron and steam,” in which “mathematics were subverting the art of centuries and a vista of possibilities opened up for tightly choreographed geometrical
evolutions—far beyond what had been possible with sailing fleets.”
Gordon argues (p. 182) that the combination of the social and technological
changes during this period had a significant impact on the Royal Navy’s command culture. As they looked back to the legacy of Nelson and forward to the
almost unlimited potential of controlled fleet actions, “the Victorians chose to
extract the myth of the central genius directing the lovely obedient fleet with
brilliance and precision.” Jutland would prove the shortcomings of this approach
to command and control.
One interesting indicator of this authoritarian approach to command is the
Royal Navy’s Signal Book, which Gordon calls (p. 183) “the supreme agent of
centralization.” Dating from 1799, the Signal Book had been established before
Nelson’s time, but what changed over this period was its size and role. In its early
* William Manchester, The Last Lion, vol. 1, Visions of Glory 1874–1932 (New York: Random House,
1983), p. 70.
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days, the Signal Book’s limitations were appreciated and its primary use was to
supplement commander’s intent. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, it had grown to over five hundred pages in two volumes, and had become
enshrined as the key enabler not only of fleet maneuvering but also of effective
naval operations.
At the end of The Rules of the Game, Gordon acknowledges (p. 564) that the
Grand Fleet achieved its strategic objective at Jutland: maintaining sea control
and holding the threat of the German High Seas Fleet at bay. At the same time,
however, he questions whether Jellicoe and the Royal Navy “gave Jutland their
best shot.” Noting that “war is infinitely unpredictable in detail, nobody can expect to control it, and the power of a military force must include its capacity to
respond rapidly and effectively to unscripted eventualities,” he states (p. 565) that
Jellicoe’s “main fault was that ‘control’ was a contract he tried to make with fate;
he feared losing it . . . and imposed a doctrinal regime which seemingly presumed
to govern the very nature of war.” One has to wonder, Gordon implicitly questions, how World War I might have transpired if the Grand Fleet had operated
with a decentralized command structure, clear commander’s intent, subordinate
empowerment, and individual initiative.
As you can imagine, at seven hundred pages in length, there is much more to
this book, including the following (p. 597):
• The story of Vice Admiral Sir George Tyron that recounts his attempts to
reinstill a Nelsonian and decentralized approach to operations, the VictoriaCamperdown collision in 1893 that ended such efforts, and the resulting
courts-martial that rewarded the members of the bridge team who, while
knowing that the ordered maneuver was going to result in a collision, held
fast to the culture of obedience and simply executed the order
• Gordon’s own lessons learned from the research, and his offering of twentyeight “syndromes” that impact maritime forces today
• Gordon’s discussion about “regulators and ratcatchers,” in which he points
out that there is in peacetime a natural rise in the predominance of “regulators,” and therefore there is a need to develop, deliberately and purposefully,
“ratcatchers”: officers comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity and ready
to exercise initiative when appropriate
It’s important to highlight that The Rules of the Game is not without its critics.
Some scholars of naval history see Gordon’s treatment of Jellicoe as too negative
and too pro-Beatty, and opine that The Rules of the Game fails to give the Royal
Navy full credit for its successful incorporation of emerging technology (efficient
and reliable mechanical propulsion, central direction of gunnery, signals intelligence, and wireless communications).
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/3
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Key Takeaways
Despite such critiques, this has become a very important book to me. I read it
while clarifying what the profession of arms means to me; what my professional
identity was—and what it should be; and how I should think about ethics in this
framework. Within this context, The Rules of the Game spoke loudly. It challenged me to think more broadly about professional military ethics, far beyond
the rules-based, compliance focus of ethics to which I had become accustomed
over the course of my career.
The story of the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century pointed out to me that
a profession’s identity, the culture that underpins it, is never static, but rather in
a constant state of evolution. Left unattended, that culture will morph, and there
is a natural tendency for bureaucratic attributes to dominate professional attributes. As a result, members of the profession have an ethical responsibility never,
never to take the profession’s identity for granted. We must assess the profession’s
identity constantly and deliberately, then nurture and sustain the attributes that
best serve the client—for us, the American people.
Additionally, I saw a cautionary tale for the U.S. Navy, with parallels between
what Gordon described as the “long, calm lee of Trafalgar” and the U.S. Navy’s
history since World War II. Reading and reflecting on The Rules of the Game
made me realize that, as stewards of our profession, we have an ethical responsibility to ensure that our Navy doesn’t fall prey to the potential for complacency
and professional erosion in what could be described as our own “long, calm lee
of Leyte Gulf.”
Finally, I saw a clear linkage between the key lessons of the book and our
Navy’s “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” The Design highlights the
critical importance of decentralized operations to achieve success in a complex
environment, and calls for our Navy to focus on being prepared for decentralized operations. Trust and confidence are the critical enablers of decentralized
operations. Bureaucratic organizations are characteristically low-trust and
low-confidence organizations. Only an organization with a strong professional
identity engenders the trust and confidence necessary to fight and win in a complex
environment.
So, reading The Rules of the Game reinforced in me the idea that there is a
war-fighting imperative that we view our Navy as a profession. Such a view isn’t
an academic exercise or a purely theoretical construct; it has practical and operational implications. As stewards of this profession, I see clearly that we have
an ethical responsibility to ensure that our professional identity, including the
attributes of our professional identity most essential for war fighting—integrity,
accountability, initiative, and toughness—is never taken for granted, but rather
constantly and deliberately developed, nurtured, and sustained.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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During the centenary anniversary of the battle of Jutland this year, I encourage
all members of the U.S. Navy to read (or reread) The Rules of the Game, reflect
on the experiences of the Royal Navy, and commit to strengthening our sense of
professional identity.

P. GARDNER HOWE III

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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